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
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Article Notes Changing U.S.-Soviet Relations
06081510 Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU in Chinese
No. 1, 13 Jan 88 pp 1-5

[Article by Song Yimin (1345 0110 2402): "Relaxation of U.S.-Soviet Tension and Profound Changes in International Relations"]

[Excerpts] The most remarkable event was the initialling of the INF treaty by the U.S. and Soviet leaders. As it stands, the INF treaty is not likely to bear any significant fruit despite the fact that it is the first U.S.-Soviet disarmament accord, because the weapons involved account for only about 4 percent of the weaponry in the arsenals of both countries. However, the background of the initialling of the accord, the momentum of disarmament pushed forward by the accord, and its inevitable effects on various fields are of rather profound significance. In the 10 years or so between the late 1970's and the 1980's, medium-range missiles have gone through the complete cycle of birth to extinction. This historical cycle was the exact epitome of the development and changes in U.S.-Soviet relations during the same period. There was tense confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early 1980's. Then a change in the situation surfaced in the second half of 1985, the initial effects of which came to light in 1987. It seems that this progress will continue into the late 1980's, though not without difficulties and zigzags.

The recently initialled INF treaty has been welcomed by U.S. allies in Western Europe, while giving rise to great unease. The root of such unease lies precisely in their growing doubts about U.S. capability and will to shield them. Western Europe is almost sure that the United States would not touch the nuclear weapons deployed in the United States proper against a Warsaw Pact countries regular offensive, and they are worried that the United States might one day cut back its troops stationed in Western Europe. One commentator said that the INF treaty foretold the complete separation of U.S. nuclear power from Europe and signified the loss of actual effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe. It was against such a background that Western European nations were determined to strengthen their defense cooperation. This momentum grew markedly in 1987. France and the FRG made the first move in their joint defense. Although the process of Western European joint defense will be a long and tortuous one, it seems that such a trend is irreversible. This will inevitably promote Western Europe's status of independence and taking the initiative in its own hands as well as the readjustment of U.S.-Western European relations. Of course, this will inject new and complicated factors into future disarmament.

Readjustment in Soviet-East European relations also took place in 1987. Its chief expression was the Soviet Union's negation of its own ossified pattern of socialist construction, while helping Eastern Europe get rid of the restrictions of such a pattern. The Soviet Union no

longer requires unanimity in everything and acknowledges some degree of variation. Regarding political relations, the Soviet Union has admitted the existence of inequality in some aspects of the past. In his speech marking the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev proposed for the first time that strict observation of the peaceful coexistence principle be applicable to relations between socialist countries and stressed that being responsible for the cause of one's own nation is also the concern of the nation's party for the common socialist cause. But for a considerably long period in the past, the Soviet Union primarily stressed the "common interests" of various socialist nations rather than their national interests, and believed that the peaceful coexistence principle was only applicable to dealing with capitalist countries, while relations between socialist nations should be on a "higher" plane than this principle. These were actually pretexts created to disregard and even violate the sovereignty of other nations.

The Arms Race and Regional Contention Continue Between the United States and the Soviet Union, While Greater Importance Is Attached to Competition in the Fields of Science and Technology, as Well as Economy [subhead]

It seems that some changes have taken place in the Soviet concept of security, with greater stress laid on the economic factor of security and the belief that the nation's basic economic base will be injured if excessive resources are staked on developing military strength. This point is also applicable to capitalist countries. In his report marking the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev posed the question "Will capitalist countries continue to develop economically, refraining from the pursuit of militarism," and answered it in the affirmative. This reflected a new theoretical cognition. The Soviet Union not only made all kinds of proposals on lowering the level of the arms race with the United States, but also made some practical concessions. It has proposed a new strategic concept of "reasonable sufficiency", which means that the building of military strength to the point of being capable of counterattacking any invasion is sufficient, and there is no need to seek power to launch an offensive. On this basis, and under the precondition that the United States is not to gain superiority, the Soviet Union has decided not to step up or reduce its armaments in a range equal to the United States and has even decided to reduce some items by a wider margin. That is already embodied in the recently initialled INF treaty. With regard to regular forces, Gorbachev dropped the hint that it might not be necessary to conduct Warsaw Pact countries disarmament on a scale corresponding to NATO disarmament. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has placed the graveness of Western challenges in science and technology on a very high plane, believing that science and technology will determine which of the two social systems will win the race.

The United States did not hide its attempt to triumph over the Soviet Union's social system with its superiority in science and technology. The United States seemed to

have a great drive for an arms race, but developments in recent years, the past year in particular, showed that the United States has come under grave restrictions from its economic conditions in developing its military strength, and what it would have liked to do was often beyond its capabilities. The Reagan administration had to axe some of its military expenditures and slow down the implementation of its SDI project. The United States is still propagating a Soviet military threat, but in fact, the threat is no longer considered very serious or imminent.

It was in such a context that the United States and the Soviet Union reached an accord on medium-range missiles. The next step will be for them to bargain about cutting back strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces and to take other disarmament measures. The most evident prospects for the future in the military field are a controlled arms race paralleled by disarmament talks. With regard to regional issues, the contention between the two sides will take the form of political struggle in the main, that is, diplomatic means will be adopted to seek a favorable political settlement.

INTER-ASIA

Australasia Response, Comment on Washington Summit, INF Treaty

Hayden Praise Quoted

52004301 Sydney *THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD* in English 16 Dec 87 p 12

[Article by David Dale]

[Text] New York, Tuesday: Briefings by Soviet and U.S. officials have convinced the Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, that progress made at the summit in Washington last week was "as dramatic as anything that has been achieved in the history of civilisation."

Mr Hayden said that while the agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles had been significant, a more important process had been started—serious steps towards eliminating 50 per cent of strategic weapons.

He was speaking yesterday after meetings with the acting director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr David Emery, and the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Mr Yuri Dubinin.

Over the course of a 45-minute press conference, Mr Hayden's enthusiasm for the summit escalated. He began by saying that "the chasm of mistrust which has been very wide is narrowing rapidly."

He described the progress made at the summit as "the most substantial potential breakthrough in arms control and disarmament in the nuclear age."

Later he described the progress as "the most dramatic thing we've seen in the nuclear age" and "as dramatic as anything that's been achieved in the history of civilisation, in terms of providing civilisation with better prospects for a future."

"Contrary to the impression that some reports give, this is not a pretty much anticlimactic thing, concluding the INF agreement," Mr Hayden said. "Progress was made on strategic weapons, which are the things that really worry us."

"We've waited more than 40 years for any movement at all to be made in getting rid of weapons, and suddenly we've got in place one substantial agreement. We go beyond that to the possibility of a 50 per cent cut which represents an extraordinarily dramatic achievement."

Mr Hayden said the briefing had been suggested to him by US and Soviet officials. "The very fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union had proposed they should fully brief me as early as possible is indicative of the respect and credibility that exists for the role that Australia has taken."

Lange Comments on Details

52004301 Auckland *THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD* in English 10 Dec 87 p 17

[Text] NZPA Wellington. The Prime Minister, Mr Lange, yesterday welcomed the signing by the United States and Soviet Union of an agreement to eliminate all land-based intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

"It is an event of considerable importance for all nations and peoples," he said.

"Both President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev deserve our praise for showing the political will and courage necessary for successfully negotiating the agreement."

"It shows that the arms race can be turned back and that alternatives to the endless accumulation of nuclear weapons are desirable and achievable."

Mr Lange said some critics had suggested that the agreement, covering only land-based missiles and a small proportion of warheads in the armouries of the nuclear weapon states, was a minor achievement.

"I disagree," Mr Lange said.

"It is the beginning of a process and for that reason it is a very important development."

"There are enormous challenges still to be faced. Negotiations are continuing on an agreement to make major cuts in strategic weapons."

"In Geneva and Vienna talks are taking place on such important matters as chemical weapons and the balance of conventional forces in Europe."

Nuclear testing is also being discussed in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union.

"While we applaud that fact and the possibility that an agreement will be reached that will limit nuclear testing, we must, however, send a message to the superpowers that the international community, with only a very small number of exceptions, wants to see an end to all nuclear testing as soon as possible," Mr Lange said.

"When you look at the big picture, all the developments that are taking place, we can see that we might well be on track to achieving what all New Zealanders and, I would hope, all other nations want."

Momentum Must Be Maintained

52004301 Auckland *THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD*
in English 14 Dec 87 p 8

[Editorial: "Holocaust in Retreat"]

[Text] History will judge the summit meeting in Washington less by what was done there than by what follows these achievements. Agreement by the superpowers to destroy all their medium-range nuclear weapons is a relatively modest step towards disarmament. But it surely enhances the chances of their consenting—possibly at a summit in Moscow next year—to the elimination of all their long-range missiles. Then the threat of the holocaust will retreat dramatically.

Hopes of reaching a turning point in East-West relations have been raised and dashed too often in the past to engender unqualified confidence in the products of last week's deliberations. Any objective evaluation of them must acknowledge that all international treaties are only as sound as the good faith and integrity of those who sign them, and of their inheritors.

Yet the fact that changes in the Soviet approach to foreign relations—including the disclosure that the Russians themselves are working on a "Star Wars" project—are accompanied by changes in Soviet domestic policies may be good reason to believe that peaceful coexistence is not an illusion after all. Together, the two developments forcefully substantiate the view that something breathtaking is happening in Russia—that a younger generation of Kremlin leaders is transforming the face of the country for the better and, indirectly, recharting the course of world history.

The momentum towards better East-West relations that President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev have established must be maintained. Otherwise the effects of decades of anti-Soviet rhetoric—largely generated by repeated instances of Soviet belligerence and folly—may again exert themselves in the United States.

Mr Reagan's time as President is approaching its end. Changes in the White House can also mean changes in attitudes to the commitments of former occupants. For instance, Mr Reagan considered the Salt-2 treaty, signed in 1979 during President Carter's term of office, to be "fatally flawed." It was never ratified by the Senate, even though the Reagan Administration broadly honoured its provisions, for a while.

As for Mr Gorbachev, he answers less to the Soviet people than to the party central committee, and there his policies lack unanimous approval, as the Yeltsin incident has shown. Yet his achievement in Washington will undoubtedly strengthen his hand in Moscow. If it should lead to a similar agreement on long-range missiles, the opponents of his reform programme are likely to be drowned beneath the popular enthusiasm for the changes he has wrought.

Dangers Still To Be Thought Through

52004301 Sydney *THE AUSTRALIAN* in English
12-13 Dec 87 p 22

[Editorial: "Just What Do We Want From the Soviets?"]

[Text] It seems that the Soviet economy is not hurting the country's leaders so much that they are prepared to put a date on withdrawal from Afghanistan in negotiations with the West. Nor are they ready to make any significant progress on human rights.

At the end of the summit talks in Washington the two superpowers did agree on an intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty but seem not to have made fundamental progress on one eliminating long-range nuclear weapons. That remains for the future. But it is much more likely now than it was, say, three years ago. Therefore, both the benefits and the dangers of a post-nuclear world are still to be thought through.

One of the greatest dangers in the summit process is the shrouding of the process in warm feelings, such as the suggestion that the Cold War may be over. The Cold War is a substitute for a hot war. It means that the conflict and competition between democracy and totalitarianism is kept below the level of armed conflict and nuclear conflagration.

But to suggest that the two systems are not locked into competition for the allegiance of mankind is to misunderstand communism, and, for that matter, to misunderstand democracy. Democratic leaders have an obligation to alert their people continually to the dimensions of the competition between democracy and totalitarianism. There is also the question whether the Soviet people, as far as they are allowed to understand these matters, want their system propped up by the West.

The great failure of detente in the 1970s was that President Nixon gave the American people to understand that the political competition was at an end and that the relationship of the two systems would now be fundamentally one of co-operation.

The consequences was that the political consensus for a strong defence and an activist foreign policy temporarily disappeared in the US. People naturally asked why should they spend all that money on defence if they were such good friends with the Soviets.

Enforceable

This point has wider application. The Soviets are masters of smooth words and hard actions. If they believe the Cold War should be at an end, let them withdraw from Afghanistan and let them really do it rather than simply always promising that they will.

Let them release the refuseniks and the hundreds of thousands of others who wish to emigrate from the USSR, let them halt the subsidy to Vietnam, which makes the occupation of Kampuchea a possibility, let them call off their Cuban surrogates in Africa, let them stop breaking up demonstrations in Moscow ... Mr Gorbachev's words are worthless unless there are real actions alongside them.

The whole symbolic approach to arms control talks is wrong. Enforceable arms control agreements can cut the risk of war and the costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. In so far as it does these things, it is good. But to pin wider hopes on the arms control process seems to be repeating the mistakes of the '70s in the '80s.

Mr Reagan has foolishly allowed the signing of a worthwhile and limited agreement, INF, to degenerate into a propaganda windfall for the Soviets with unpredictable consequences. Whether the crisis in the Soviet economy is so great that Mr Gorbachev will be forced to rein in his imperialist operations around the world remains to be seen.

There are two valid arguments about the United States-Soviet deals to reduce and perhaps eliminate altogether nuclear weapons from the arsenals of these two superpowers.

There is no doubt that were people all over the world allowed to speak and vote in freedom there would be a thumping majority for the destruction of all nuclear weapons everywhere. The argument is more about how one gets to that position.

The Soviet system is repressive and closed and has a fast declining economy that has the country's dictators worried enough to work with the West for a breathing space.

Danger

To give the system the breathing space in defence expenditure that it needs is, in the eyes of critics of disarmament deals, helping to perpetuate a system the

Soviet people themselves know has failed. And that system has failed partly because it has put production of high technology weaponry in front of the basic standard of living of the people.

To do deals to eliminate nuclear weapons in the Soviet-United States arsenals entirely is to enter a whole new phase of balance of power in different weaponry.

The danger for the open democratic system is that the closed authoritarian system will have the ability to be able to mask new weapon development and prevent enough verification procedures to make sure that disarmament has in fact taken place to the fullest extent stipulated in the agreements.

To continue to refuse to give the Kremlin the economic breathing space it needs is obviously risky for the democracies, given the popularity of nuclear disarmament. It is also being very hard-hearted about the already great sufferings of the Soviet people.

But what are we about? What do we believe in? Surely it is the proliferation of democratic systems as the ultimate saviour of peoples everywhere and the ultimate way of making wars unnecessary, given the good sense of free people with free speech and free institutions. Are we not in danger of putting the cart before the horse by putting non-proliferation of defence weaponry before the proliferation of democracies?

There is also the point that in helping authoritarian regimes to perpetuate themselves by making it economically easy to do so is to risk the consolidation and spread of economic authoritarianism.

The Soviets and the Americans have severely damaged their economies in maintaining a balance of nuclear power that has kept the world free of superpower wars since the end of World War II. Now that is all changing.

What we should be alive to doing is to link firmly democratic rights and the human rights that go with them to the disarmament the Soviets so desperately want. This may slow the speed of disarmament, but is it not worth it if we wish to strive for more lasting solutions?

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Background on Nuclear Free Zones
52001032 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 20, Oct 87 pp 39-40

[Article by V. Bogachev: "On Nuclear Free Zones"]

[Text] In the broad complex of specific practical measures proposed by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community for ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear catastrophe, the creation of nuclear free zones in various regions of the planet is called upon to play a not unimportant role. It is truly difficult to overestimate the importance of turning dangerous areas of the world into demilitarized zones, where, in particular, nuclear weapons shall not be produced or placed.

The proposal of Finnish President Kekkonen made back in 1963 to create a zone free of nuclear weapons in northern Europe was met with satisfaction by the world community. The United Nations has approved the idea of nuclear free zones. Specialists on problems of disarmament have emphasized that the creating of such a zone, for example, in northern Europe, will reduce the threat of nuclear war for 23 million people living in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, and will help stabilize the military-political situation throughout the world.

The Soviet Union expressed its positive attitude toward the initiative on a nuclear free northern Europe. It has continuously expressed its readiness to serve as a guarantor of a nuclear free zone in this area, and to take a number of steps on its part, applicable to its own territory, which would help strengthen the status of a zone free of nuclear weapons.

Attempting to contribute to the creation of favorable conditions for the implementation of the proposal on a nuclear free northern Europe, the USSR has already dismantled intermediate range missile launch platforms on the Kola Peninsula, and a large portion of the launch platforms for such missiles in the rest of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts, and has redeployed from these districts several battalions of operational-tactical missiles. The Soviet Union has advanced specific proposals on reducing naval activity in the aquatorias adjacent to northern Europe, and on limiting the intensity of large military exercises in this area.

The unilateral USSR pledge not to be first to employ nuclear weapons has received a tremendous response throughout the world. This historic decision opens new hopeful prospects for achieving agreements on nuclear free zones. Moreover, the Soviet Union is prepared to take on a commitment not to employ nuclear weapons under any circumstances against those states in northern Europe that become participants in the nuclear free zone.

The countries of the socialist community hailed the efforts to create nuclear free zones in northern Europe and the Balkans, and supported Sweden's proposal that a

corridor be created in Europe along the line of contact of the Warsaw Treaty Organization states and NATO, free of battlefield and nuclear weapons. They expressed the opinion that to improve the effectiveness of the corridor it is desirable to expand it on both sides of the line of contact, taking into consideration the tactical and technical specifications of these weapons.

The United States of America and certain other NATO countries adhere to obstructionist positions on the problems of security and stability in northern Europe. Washington has long attempted to expand the limits of its bridgehead for unleashing "limited nuclear war" in Europe at the expense of the Scandinavian countries. The U. S. is attempting to force its NATO allies Norway and Denmark to reconcile themselves to "creeping, gradual deployment" of American nuclear weapons on their territory. For this purpose the Pentagon incessantly sends into their waters its warships, which may have nuclear weapons on board, and sends U. S. Air Force planes to their airfields. The nuclear threat to the northern countries of Europe increased seriously after the deployment of American nuclear first-strike missiles on the territory of Britain, the FRG and other U. S. NATO allies. Today the flight paths of American cruise missiles planned in the Pentagon pass over the territory of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland.

Washington is not interested in nuclear free zones in northern Europe because, in addition to everything else, their creation may become a precedent for further reduction of military activity in this region. The U. S. advances, in particular, absurd "arguments" that Denmark and Norway as NATO members do not have the right to declare themselves nuclear free countries or to prevent the deployment of American nuclear weapons on their territory in the event a "crisis situation" arises.

Twenty years ago a treaty was signed in the capital of Mexico on banning nuclear weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The treaty commits its participants not to allow the production, placement or testing of nuclear weapons on their territory, and anticipates the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. Although the U. S., along with all the nuclear powers, signed the protocol pledging them to respect the status of this nuclear free zone, Washington undermines the spirit of the (Tlatelolco) Treaty by unceremoniously conducting nuclear tests in the state of Nevada, which is located in the immediate proximity of Latin American territory.

On 6 August 1985, at a session of the states of the South Pacific Forum, held on Rarotonga Island (Cook Islands) a treaty was approved on a nuclear free zone in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. The participating countries in the forum — Australia, Western Samoa, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Niue, New Zealand, Tuvalu, Fiji,

and others — decided to refuse to produce, acquire or place on their territories any nuclear devices, carry out nuclear explosions or store radioactive waste.

On 15 December 1986 the Soviet Union signed protocols to this treaty and thereby pledged to observe the nuclear free status of the zone. The KNR [Chinese People's Republic] also signed the protocols. But the U. S., Britain and France refused to join the treaty. U. S. State Department representative (C. Redmen) stated that the growing number of proposals on regional nuclear free zones may potentially undermine the "policy of deterrence" being conducted by the United States.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community resolutely oppose the senseless competition in the production and stockpiling of destructive weapons, including nuclear weapons. This USSR approach has found specific expression in the program of the Soviet government to free mankind of nuclear weapons in this century, and in the position taken by the Soviet Union at the Soviet-American summit conference in Iceland. The efforts of the USSR to ensure favorable conditions for the creation of nuclear free zones are also dictated by its concern for strengthening stability in Europe and throughout the world.

In his address to the participants in the international forum, "For a Nuclear Free World, For the Survival of Mankind," CPSU Central Committee Secretary M. S. Gorbachev affirmed the adherence of the Soviet Union to the idea of creating nuclear free zones in various regions of the world. "It is important, in our view, as the level of military confrontation is reduced, to implement such measures as would allow a reduction, and still better eliminate entirely the possibility of a surprise attack. It is necessary to remove from the zone of contact the most dangerous, offensive types of weapons," stated the Soviet leader.

The movement for nuclear free zones has developed throughout the world. Hundreds of municipalities in Japan, Spain, Belgium, Holland, Britain, the United States and other countries have declared their cities nuclear free. Opposition to militarism is growing daily.

The constructive position of the USSR on the problems of war and peace has made it possible to achieve a fundamental agreement between the Soviet Union and the U. S. on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles. This is a hopeful factor.

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INF Treaty's Impact on FRG's Security Concepts
52001040 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 52, Dec 87 pp 3-4

[Article by Nikita Zholkver]

[Text] On the whole, Bonn welcomes the treaty as the first step towards real disarmament. What's more, the ruling CDU/CSU coalition, Free Democrats, representatives of the opposition (Social Democrats and the Greens) are vying for credit for the "double zero."

Until quite recently, the CDU's General Secretary Geissler went all out to prove that the "zero option" on missiles would detract from West German security. When the Washington summit was in progress, however, he extended invitations to a number of Soviet journalists with the express purpose of letting us know that he had changed his stance. It turned out that "double zero" did not increase danger—quite the contrary. That was a revolutionary decision, said Geissler, which testified to an increase in confidence between the two blocs, and which was, in itself, a confidence-building measure. He spoke in favour of continued strategic, chemical and conventional arms reduction. True, not everything our host said made us happy, but on the whole we were favourably impressed. Changes for the better are obvious, although the way Christian Democrats—and many other politicians, for that matter—see it, "nuclear deterrence" remains a cornerstone of West German and indeed West European security.

At one time Helmut Kohl himself and other leaders of the ruling parties tried to prove the danger and impossibility of eliminating intermediate-range missiles from Europe. Jorgen Todenhofer is still unable to tolerate the INF. He has resigned his position as spokesman of the CDU/CSU faction on disarmament in the Bundestag and in the Bundestag arms control subcommittee. Well, that was honest of him, at least.

Regarding all the obstacles which the conservatives put up in the way of the treaty, official Bonn—and the Federal Chancellor in particular—must be given their due. At the critical moment when the fate of the treaty was at stake, Helmut Kohl—who by no means commanded unanimous support on the issue within his own party—displayed political realism and farsightedness by removing the barriers which obstructed progress towards the treaty. Nevertheless, doubts as to the correctness of this move still persist in the CDU, let alone CSU.

Social Democrats celebrate the "double zero" as a personal victory. Indeed, they have more reason to do so than the conservative parties. Let's not forget, however, that it was Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt, who, as Chancellor, "godfathered" the NATO decision on rear-mament. Later, the party's stand on Euromissiles was not always consistent either, and all but led to a split in the party.

I shall not attempt therefore to arbitrate between the ruling parties and the opposition who are really more interested in votes than in the truth. Hermann Eich of Bonn's newspaper *General-Anzeiger* is quite right in saying that instead of boasting of their past accomplishments they would do better to think about the future. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine's* advice to them is "to secure a place under the sun rather than merely react to what is happening in Washington and in Moscow."

Today Bonn is more afraid of new Soviet peace bids than it is of Russian tanks and missiles. How is it to respond to these bids? The Berlin meeting of the Warsaw Treaty states on December 11 came as an obvious relief. Had the meeting put forward some new proposals—concerning, say, tactical missile or conventional arms—panic may have erupted on the banks of the Rhine. In anticipation of Moscow's next initiatives (believed here to be in the offing) West Germany is feverishly seeking its own alternative concept of security and disarmament for the post-"double-zero" period.

The basic concept, which consists of reliance upon American guarantees and nuclear deterrents, remains unchanged. There is an awareness among some circles in Bonn, however, that the scrapping of the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union, renders talk about the need for nuclear deterrence much less convincing. After all, the weapons that remain—tactical missiles and nuclear cannon—can hit targets on German soil only. (The British and French nuclear forces and the American aircraft carriers are not mentioned somehow.) Will they suffice to stop the "Soviet aggressor," Volker Ruhe, Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, wonders. Won't such deterrence actually turn out to be "self-detering"? Won't it strengthen the positions of those who demand that an end be put to mass destruction weapons once and for all? And won't, in that case, former advocates of the nuclear deterrence concept denounce it? Ruhe's line of reasoning leads him to reject—at least for the time being—the prospect of the world going non-nuclear. Therefore he suggests that a new West European security concept should rest on deterrents that are as "convincing" as they were prior to the change in the situation.

It would seem logical to modernize tactical missiles with a view to bringing certain targets on Soviet territory within their reach, and to carry out a new round of rearmament. Such measures, however, are extremely unpopular today. "Modernization is not the order of the day," Ruhe states. What's more, he suggests that tactical nuclear missiles be reduced to a minimum (but not eliminated), insists that they be "regrouped" (whatever this means) and that the quality of such weapons is of decisive importance. If what he is talking about is not modernization, then what is?

A sustained effort has been made to persuade West Europeans that nuclear weapons are necessary as a counter balance to the Warsaw Treaty bloc's overwhelming supremacy in conventional arms. Now Ruhe is trying

to absolutize the political functions of nuclear weapons by demanding that they should be retained even in a situation where a lower parity between the sides' conventional capabilities has been achieved. Ruhe is not alone in this opinion. Michael Sturmer, an adviser of the Federal Chancellor's, takes the same view. "An equilibrium in conventional arms," he says, "does not obviate the need for nuclear deterrence." Manfred Worner, West Germany's current Defence Minister and the future NATO Secretary-General, openly discusses the likely modernization of tactical missiles in the nineties.

Under the circumstances, a great deal depends on what stand Bonn will ultimately take. Neither Ruhe's pronouncements, Worner's statement, nor Sturmer's articles should probably be regarded as the last word on the matter. No well-balanced West European security concept has been worked out yet; on the other hand, nuclear stock is falling and getting ever harder to sell.

Fully aware of this, West Germany is trying to concentrate public attention on the conventional arms issue. It is these arms—or rather their imbalance—that pose the greatest danger, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* tells its readers. So before attempting a reduction in nuclear arms it is necessary to work out a conventional arms policy. The idea is that if Gorbachev suggests a "third zero," the West should respond with an initiative in a different sphere, or put forward a convincing precondition—insisting at the very least, for instance, that the Soviet Union should unilaterally reduce its tanks and artillery in Central Europe by 50 percent. This is not a dogma, just a school of thought. No common approach to the conventional arms issue has yet been worked out in West Germany, but the search for it is in progress. The Foreign Ministry has come up with a few ideas recently, for instance. There is an element of constructive thinking in these ideas, I'm sure. As distinct from Worner, Hans-Dietrich Genscher believes it unreasonable to exclude the tactical nuclear missile issue from the agenda of future talks on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces within the area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. In general, he is tending towards the "third zero." Genscher suggests that the imbalance of conventional weapons be stabilized stage by stage, and that in the "central phase" of the talks equal NATO and WTO ceilings be agreed upon—starting with Central Europe. In Genscher's opinion, these ceilings ought to be below the current NATO level. He suggests that in the long run the sides should agree upon structural changes ruling out offensive action either way.

Other West German politicians advance similar ideas. A welcome development in the quest for ways to reduce nuclear weapons is the wish to put an end to the former practice of numerical discussions which has practically landed the Vienna talks in a blind alley. It will be recalled that back in 1983 the U.S.S.R. offered to stop calculating the numerical strength of the armies and the number of

weapons and to set the ceilings for both sides. It has taken West Germany four years to see how constructive this idea is. Well, better late than never.

There is also awareness in Bonn that "the key to stability in the field of conventional arms lies in equal low-level ceilings and in structural changes." (Admiral Elmar Schmahling.)

There are other viewpoints in the FRG, of course. Deliberately unacceptable reservations are made, and new rearmament is demanded (including that in the conventional sphere). Plans for nuclear arms modernization (whatever Ruhe may call it), projects to step up a West European anti-missile shield, and other military programmes have not been removed from the agenda. What will Bonn's future concept of security for Western Europe be like? The record of negotiations over intermediate-range missiles goes to show that the way to security lies in reasonable compromises, in meeting each other halfway.

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Comments on Britain's Nuclear Disarmament Movement

52001041 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 52, Dec 87 pp 4-7

[Article by NEW TIMES special correspondent Galina Sidorova under the rubric "Repercussions": "A Clash of Concepts"]

[Excerpt] When the issue of foreign policy comes up in conversation, a Soviet visitor is often told: "Compared with you, a great power, we are a small nation." This phrase is accompanied by a sad sign for Great Britain's former imperial might and...haughty comments about "continental Europeans."

Trapped in Stereotypes

Britons are, of course, different, with different views and national features. Among these various traits, common or otherwise, one particular trait is, I believe, of special significance in the shaping of the political priorities of the silent majority whose predilections have been so skillfully manipulated by the present Conservative minority to remain in power. This British trait is an inflated sense of national pride and self-importance. A feeling which, over the past few decades, because of the particular circumstances of our nuclear age with its betrayal of the logic of reason, has been associated with the military factor—the status of a nuclear power with robust defences. The loss by their country of this status, in the opinion of many Britons, will further detract from its role in world affairs.

It is the issue of what underlies a nation's might that has become, in my view, the point of departure in a debate on Britain's unilateral nuclear disarmament and on the

role of an independent nuclear deterrent, which I witnessed during a recent visit. The British government's stance is known. Our magazine has written too about the stance of forces gravitating towards the political centre (see issue No 49 for 1987). In this respect I was particularly interested in the various poles of opinion among the grass roots: the position of rank-and-file Conservatives, like-minded members of other parties and non-party people, and the hidden causes of dissent among the Labourites some of whom believe that Britain's unilateral nuclear disarmament policy, which currently underlies their party's international course, has not justified itself and should be dropped. Finally, I wanted to see how the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which was holding a conference in London in late November, was going to defend its cherished dream.

Let me begin with a conversation I had over a cup of coffee with Lady Olga Maitland, a member of one of Britain's richest aristocratic families, a colleague from the Sunday Express, a budding Conservative politician, leader of a public organization calling itself Families for Defence, and simply a charming woman of unshakable views. At the last elections Lady Olga ran in a district in London's East End (a poor area—G.S.) which Conservatives are usually afraid even to approach. Her constituents were predominantly immigrants from Bangladesh. Lady Maitland became a vice president of their association for promoting barter. She spent whole days campaigning in the district and collected 15 percent of the votes.

She said the following:

"Britain has a great past. Of course, today we are not a superpower. But we exercise considerable influence on international developments, especially with the incumbent Prime Minister. We are among the privileged European nations and, economically, the strongest. On top of this, one should not forget about our strategic position between the United States and Europe. (Note that Britons sometimes consider themselves Europeans and, at other times, distance themselves from them—G.S.) And, of course, we are one of the nuclear powers. This is very important. I refuse to admit the possibility, of a nuclear-free Britain. Nuclear arsenals in the world are too big. They must be reduced. But it is impossible to eliminate them. I shall campaign most vigorously against the idea of a nuclear-free Europe in any form. It is unrealistic."

"Why?"

"Because it will then be necessary to boost spending on conventional defences, and none of the European nations will want to do that."

"And what about a proposal by the U.S.S.R. and its allies to reduce this class of weapons as well?"

"As yet, I can see too many and too advanced Soviet tanks in Europe. We are not fully acquainted with your capabilities. I do not believe that Mr Gorbachev wants to start a war. But one cannot be completely certain about it. This is why I regard a strong defence as the principal condition for security and peace."

"What do you think of the Soviet-U.S. INF treaty?"

"I have mixed feelings. On the one hand, it is a great relief to see your SS-20s go. But on the other, I have a foreboding that the years of inspections will bring only tears. I'm not sure about the effectiveness of the verification procedures envisaged by the treaty. Besides, it is imperative, I repeat, to take urgent action regarding your conventional forces, because we see them as a threat. This is why in NATO they are considering compensatory measures. Politically, it will not be easy to get them through. But the leadership of the alliance must do something so that we feel ourselves to be secure. Perhaps, they should increase the number of U.S. sea-based cruises or aircraft."

"So, you're for a strong defence. Does this explain the name of your organization?"

"I founded Families for Defence in 1983 when I realized that the propaganda clamour over the Greenham Common women had become too shrill and the anti-nuclear debate was getting out of control. Nobody then was discussing at grassroots level why we needed a defence and why we needed NATO. And that was absolutely wrong. To my mind, we had gone for too long without explaining obvious things. Sometimes, however, we cannot do without explanations. So I decided to challenge CND and stir up the silent majority. Our organization includes ordinary men and women from the most diverse walks of life. I assure you that there are almost no aristocrats, they are too lazy. There are two or three thousand permanent members, but we have many sympathizers. We are independent of the Conservative Party. Our central council includes, among others, Liberals and Social Democrats. We hope that it will be possible to return to the time of consensus among the main political parties on defence policy...."

Lady Olga represents the extreme right of public opinion. I wouldn't have dwelt upon our meeting in so much detail but for the fact that the several thousand outspoken followers of Lady Maitland are supported also by part of the silent majority, who are equally trapped in old stereotypes. Such is the reality of British politics today. By the way, as we parted, Lady Olga told me of her dream to come to the U.S.S.R. and see "what you have going on over there."

The Shadow of Strength

Regardless of how the attitude to the Soviet Union may be changing in the British Isles, and it has been changing markedly, so far, one has to admit, this has not affected

Britain's nuclear doctrine. The authorities, on the contrary are attempting to resuscitate their positions-of-strength policy and convince compatriots that it was this policy that made the Soviet-U.S. INF treaty and indeed arms control progress in general possible. These claims are aimed primarily at the Labourites.

Hesitation about the effectiveness of the unilateral nuclear disarmament policy is increasingly manifest among the party's leadership. Why so?

"The most frightful thing for a politician is to be accused of weakness or lack of patriotism," explains Labour MP Joan Ruddock. "This is why many are afraid to advocate disarmament. One can see all the time how our opponents play on the British people's national sentiment. The national importance syndrome is closely associated with a strong defence. Some of my party colleagues are seeking to change our 'anti-nuclear course.' They argue that we shall retain nuclear weapons as long as these are retained by others. As a rule, these people logically end up in the camp of those who believe that we shall always live with the bomb. Could we have won the elections with our unilateral nuclear disarmament policy? I'm told: 'No.' I respond: 'We haven't tried.' And, generally speaking, it is, in my opinion, wrong, when talking about our defeat, to blame everything on the defence aspect. We need a more specific stance on all the other issues too, so that we can offer the voters more than just good wishes."

I asked Joan as vice-president of the Labour Party's Defence Committee about the alternative to the independence nuclear deterrent potential which the Labourites could offer the British people without offending their sense of national self-esteem.

"We ought to get down seriously to the problem of a non-provocative, or sufficient, non-nuclear defence. After making this concept a matter of practical policy, the Labourites could shift the emphasis to other priorities, for example the economic sphere...."

Joan ranks among prominent CND members. She belongs to the Labour wing that is firmly committed to the unilateral nuclear disarmament policy and thinks it vital not to replace it, but to view it in the context of global security and the universal process of disarmament. As it is, however, some of the Labour leaders are overly concerned with "shoring up" their positions in the military-political field. They stress the need for a strong defence and for upgrading conventional weaponry, and talk about transferring funds to non-nuclear military programmes if the country decides to scrap the Trident one. They add that Britain should remain a NATO member.

"We've Started Something"

The name of the game is a strong defence, which seems to provide a guarantee of security. This is a well-beaten path in politics. But there are people in Britain, indeed a

whole social organization, who risked taking a different path as far back as the late 1970s. They put forward what was a revolutionary and is still regarded by many as a seditious idea: by dint of example and steps towards unilateral disarmament, to break the vicious circle of reciprocal threats and general suspicion. Starting with their own country, by making it nuclear-free. I am positive that if there hadn't been such daring ideas in the peace movement and if there hadn't been people backing them, the new manner of political thinking wouldn't have made it to international politics, new approaches to long-standing problems wouldn't have been found.

At its annual conference the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament demonstrated its strength. In spite of attacks from the right and the departure from CND of part of the silent majority, who have accepted the Conservatives' arguments, it displayed firmness by refusing to take one retrograde step and by suggesting options for its inclusion in the system of international security. Even such a committee opponent of CND as Lady Maitland admitted that they were becoming professionals and that, although their number had somewhat dropped, they were gaining greater access to the corridors of power and influence.

Speaking of influence, two thirds of Labour MPs are CND members. Two of them, John McWilliam and John Evans, have been nominated to the House of Commons' Select Committee on Defence for the first time.

Representatives of the Soviet Peace Committee were invited to the last CND conference for the first time too. They spoke in discussions on the themes "After the Summit" and "Gorbachev, 'new thinking' and peace movement."

What else was discussed at the conference?

In the opinion of CND vice chairman Elena Lieven, the debates focussed mainly on the organization's possible influence on British foreign policy.

"The conference," Elena said, "passed a resolution against NATO's compensatory measures. Another immediate goal is to stop the Trident programme. It is, you'll agree, outrageous that while the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are reducing their nuclear arms, Britain is going to build up its. We are targeting also SDI which promotes the escalation of the nuclear race. We are for making European cooperation in the military field go non-nuclear. And the paramount task—we adopted a strategic resolution on it—is to fit unilateral nuclear disarmament into a broader context of radical changes in British foreign policy, for example, link it with attempts to make NATO abandon its first-strike strategy and declare a moratorium on nuclear testing, among other things."

CND chairman Bruce Kent added:

"The policy of Britain's unilateral nuclear disarmament should be included in the world context. We are disarming because we want the entire world to move in the same direction. Sometimes, indeed, it looked as though we had been concerned only with British arms. It's time to look at what's happening around us."

"What other tasks are you setting yourselves?"

"It is essential to work seriously with journalists, teachers and scientists—all those who could educate the nation effectively in a spirit of peace. We intend to do much to help the silent majority understand us for what we really are."

"Do you think it is possible to change British public opinion in favour of foregoing the necessity of independent nuclear forces in maintaining the nation's international prestige?"

"Let me begin by noting that the stereotypes on which the Conservatives have been basing their policy namely fear of the Russians, are rapidly disintegrating. You know that the latest public opinion polls here have shown people to be equally apprehensive of both the Russians and the Americans. The very foundation of the policy is falling apart. We are explaining that the main threat to the British today is the accidental use of nuclear weapons by a maniac who has managed to get hold of the bomb. It is possible to reduce the risk only by lowering the level of nuclear confrontation. The economic consequences of a military buildup also, in a role. They are more keenly felt in the United States, play the U.S.S.R. But they are felt in this country as well. Explaining this, we seek to protect the well-being of our people. As far as national pride and prestige are concerned.... I think this country can be proud. We can be proud of Shakespeare. We can, finally, be gratified that Scotch whisky is the best in the world. The Swiss, for example, are proud of their watches and do not feel wretched about not having the bomb. In short, there's much work to be done by psychologists and you, journalists, too. As to us, 'we have started something' too, as the conference's motto says...."

During that visit to London I often travelled by Tube—the most convenient and fastest means of transportation in that city. One Friday evening a dense crowd was drifting into the Tube. People were either hurrying to the shops—Christmas was not far away—or, already appeased and loaded with plastic bags of purchases, on their way home. In that human anthill the traits of the British character came out clearly enough. A Briton retains dignity even in a crowd. He manages not to jostle even when it seems impossible to avoid a collision. And if he does push you, he will unfailingly say he's sorry. I behaved similarly, when the human stream carried me into the carriage and right up against an elderly lady. She accepted my apology with a silent nod, continuing to knit imperturbably. That's when I realized what makes a

British crowd different from a Moscow one. It is their imperturbability and immersion in their own thoughts or activities. I asked myself: "What are they keeping quiet about?"

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Western "Right-Wing" Reaction to INF
52001039 Moscow *NEW TIMES in English*
No 52, Dec 87 p 7

[Article by Lev Makarevich]

[Text] Reaction of right-wing circles in the U.S.A. and Western Europe to the missile agreement.

The Russians will soon "occupy" Greenham Common in Britain. In broad daylight and without firing a single shot. They will demand cement and timber to construct three buildings—one a headquarters for Soviet inspectors, one to house high-tech verification equipment, and one for storage. The British are expected to provide the "reds" with telephones, high-frequency radios, comfortable toilets (a matter of particular pride), electricity, transport, and medical care. Moscow, however, will pick up the bill.

These arrangements are to be carried out in order to guarantee the effective work of Soviet inspectors at the nuclear base in Greenham Common and in Molesworth.

Some people in Europe and the United States are evidently shocked by the nightmarish spectre of Bolsheviks walking around American military bases. The small number of critics of the INF treaty should not mislead anyone. Their influence is out of all proportion to their actual numbers, and they have not yet had their last word.

The prejudice shown towards Moscow by conservative extremists on both sides of the Atlantic reminds one of the prejudice harboured by the notorious General George S. Patton, who described the Russians as "a scurvy race and simply savages" and believed that the Russians could not be trusted. The tone, evaluations and epithets used by some of the "gravediggers" of the INF treaty are quite in the spirit of General Patton's strong verbiage.

By signing the new arms treaty with Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, President Reagan has lost his senses, sold out to the Russians and is plunging headlong into another Munich for the sake of "peace in our time." That is the view voiced by a broad coalition of conservatives in the United States. "It is tragic that we have a President who has made himself nothing more than an instrument of Soviet propaganda," another American conservative said.

The INF treaty is "a tragic mistake," "a Pyrrhic victory," "a challenge." This is how the accord has been described by some people in Europe. "The Soviet rulers cannot begin their move westward so long as one of the West European nations is capable of annihilating the invading armour by

means of its short- and medium-range missiles," reads an article published in the London Times. "Even if the proposed treaty were verifiable, the absence of such a deterrent is an open invitation to such a move (Soviet invasion—L.M.), a simple fact which even an indifferent strategist like Hitler would have understood."

The conservatives have not only devised labels and swear words like "denuclearization of Europe" and "nuclear Finlandization." They have also proposed "compensation" plans which include the deployment in Europe of B-52 bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles and of additional F-15E and F-111 planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons, submarines and surface ships with cruise missiles on board, "modernization" (a British euphemism), or in plain words, the creation of new generations of medium- and shorter-range nuclear weapons, particularly in Britain and France.

Conservative extremists are prepared to give maximum publicity and support to the amendments that would flush the essence out of the treaty. They are intent on spoiling Moscow-Washington relations in order to render talks on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic arms impossible. They aim to exert pressure on President Reagan with the aim of wresting new concessions on the Strategic Defence Initiative which, they think, might damage Gorbachev's prestige; to urge the Kremlin to allow the inspection of not only the agreed sites but also of any other sites where the Russians might try to hide their intermediate-range missiles; to help elect a presidential candidate who would bury the agreement; to discredit both Ronald Reagan (up to the point of impeachment—don't forget Richard Nixon—over the Iran-gate scandal, which is not yet over) and the Soviet leadership (by harping on the issues of human rights, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and Kampuchea, and by playing on the difficulties of perestroika). Let Moscow and Washington bay for each other's blood.

The scions of General Patton have heard the call of destiny and believe they will achieve success.

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Falin Calls INF Ratification Essential First Step
52001045 Moscow *MOSCOW NEWS in English*
No 50, 20-27 Dec 87 p 3

[Article by Valentin Falin under the rubric "the World on My Personal Computer": "It's Happened"]

[Text] The agreement has been signed.

It was signed on December 8, 1987, at 2 p.m. Washington Time, in the East Room at the White House. Civilization gained a new dimension.

What seemed practically impossible till the last moment because fact.

Of course, there are still procedures of ratification of the agreement, which are full of surprises. We can easily imagine that battles will be fought around the agreement in the course of election campaigns, in the mass media and even at high society parties. All that will happen. But, nevertheless, the agreement on INF missiles has been signed in spite of the snarls—there were quite enough of natural ones and even more artificial ones.

The agreement is on the destruction of two classes of nuclear weapons which belong to the two biggest powers on Earth. Nothing can reverse what has been fulfilled.

The agreement expressed and formulated the truth—agreements of reason can be stronger than the most sophisticated weapons systems. But this agreement shrinks the nuclear stockpiles by a mere four per cent and is incapable, as it were, for this reason of radically changing the situation for the better or, to be more accurate, of making it better to such an extent that we'd be able to speak about the danger of nuclear catastrophe in the past tense.

What, then, is under discussion? Why are so many hopes being pinned on the success of the present summit and why did the opponents of Soviet-US cooperation attack the head of the administration so fiercely?

The extreme right-wing, die-hard reactionaries are denying credibility to Ronald Reagan, whom they described as a symbol of aggressive anti-communism only yesterday. The treacherous word "betrayal" emanates from the TV screens and newspaper pages. The word penetrates the mind of the "mass" reader and TV watcher. The "weak president", if we believe such a statement, is becoming "a puppet of Moscow, who is playing up to communist propaganda".

Not only agreements call for verification. The rhetoric and deeds of the opponents of the agreements merit the most detailed analysis when outlined against such a background. They reject the constructive alternative to confrontation to a triumphant end. The reality, in which the new political thinking, proposed by the USSR, has to make its way, is presented in their position, maybe, most vividly without any embellishments. The opponents of international cooperation and good-neighbourliness do not throw money to the winds. They are perfectly well aware what the four per cent of nuclear weapons, now being excluded from the confrontation, are fraught with.

If the INF missiles can be scrapped, then the prospect for dismantling the central strategic systems and tactical nuclear weapons will, naturally, become more plausible.

If, in relation to the INF missiles, unprecedented verification methods are introduced, which exclude the ruses and violations by the governments, who take the obligations, then the objections by the skeptics, for whom disarmament was, allegedly, a desirable, but unattainable goals, are rejected of their own accord.

It is impossible to make the second, third and other steps without making the first step. After having made this key first step to the, as yet, unknown world, humankind will be quite capable of discovering not only the laws of physics or stars in the sky, but also something not as yet cognizable in itself—how to be human and to settle its problems humanely, i.e., basing its actions on common sense, and fairly.

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GDR Representative To SIPRI on Possible CW Ban
52001044 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 51, 27 Dec 87-3 Jan 88 p 6

[Interview with Prof Karlheinz Lohs, full member and head of the Chemical Toxicology Research Centre of the GDR Academy of Sciences, by Andrei Gurkov under the rubric "Expert's Forecast": "Will Chemical Weapons Be Banned Next Year?"]

[Text] Professor Karlheinz Lohs, full member of the GDR Academy of Sciences, heads the chemical toxicology research centre of that academy in Leipzig. He is the only representative of socialist countries in the heads of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), with which he has been cooperating since 1970.

At the request of MN Karlheinz Lohs discussed the prospects of a convention banning chemical weapons.

[Lohs] To my mind, there is a real opportunity for concluding this convention in 1988. At the disarmament conference in Geneva, which I happened to attend as adviser to diplomats from the GDR, East and West experts had already come to an agreement on all major technical issues, including control and elimination. There were two circumstances that stimulated progress at the negotiations; firstly, the Soviet Union's readiness to make a major step towards the partners of a whole range of control problems. For example, during the demonstration of chemical weapons at the Shikhany military installation the USSR went much further than anyone expected. Now the US even alleges that "super-control" is needed in the USSR. Secondly, public and, above all, European pressure has grown appreciably. Very little has been said in the press or by antiwar movements about chemical weapons in the course of several decades, and they were being improved while the focus of attention was on nuclear weapons. Now, the struggle for banning this monstrous weapon, meant above all for mass destruction of peaceful populations, is

becoming one of the priority directions of the peace movement. To my mind, public opinion was largely activated by the joint initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDPG), advanced in June 1985, aimed at setting up in Central Europe a zone free of chemical weapons. This proposal had broad repercussions, and it was joined by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and backed by many parties, statesmen and public organizations. It also influenced in its own way the Geneva negotiations.

[Gurkov] Won't this initiative lose its topicality if the convention is concluded?

[Lohs] I am sure it won't. Even if the convention is concluded tomorrow, about another ten years will be needed to eliminate all stocks of chemical weapons. The setting up of such a zone in Central Europe "at the junction" of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, where many weapons have already been concentrated, could become the first step in the world process of destroying chemical weapons.

[Gurkov] Won't the convention be undermined by the US plans to start large-scale production of binary weapons?

[Lohs] The fact is that we are going through a sort of turning point. The real danger of a new round of the chemical arms race being created should prompt us to conclude the convention as early as possible. Naturally, its present text also includes binary weapons, that is, the binary weapon known today. But as a chemist specializing in toxicology I see real danger in the fact that the principle of binary weapons opens practically unlimited opportunities for developing ever new and dozens of times more poisonous combinations which are not embraced by the present text of the convention. And since the convention covers the development, production, storing and use of chemical weapons but does not ban research in this sphere, then investigations may be continued. Therefore, the convention must surely have a paragraph that, say, every five years it is necessary to convene a verification conference to take into consideration the latest tendencies. And what if some states do not sign the convention? For a potential aggressor the binary weapon is a happy find! So, the binary weapon raises the problem of chemical weapons of a qualitatively new level.

[Gurkov] What do we need to sign such a convention?

[Lohs] First of all, political will, especially on the part of the US. There is also uncertainty in the stand taken by France, which ultimately wants to preserve its own nuclear and chemical stocks. Therefore, even after the conclusion of the convention, the French, I believe, intend to keep in reserve for another eight years a certain

amount of poisonous gases. But I am not sure that the French stocks could really influence world politics. If there is goodwill, there will be a convention. I repeat, the text is ready in principle.

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Dep MFA Rogachev on Asian Security
52001047 Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English
No 258, 29 Dec 87 pp 1-7

[Article by USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Rogachev: "Peace and Security in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Results of the Past Year"]

[Text] We are approaching the new year of 1988. History will show by which events it is going to be marked. In our view, the most important thing is that the new year should not lose the high pace and the busy political calendar of the expiring year and preserve and nourish the "tree of hope" planted at the third Soviet-American summit in Washington.

This naturally refers to the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles which has come as the first step in real disarmament. There has been some progress, too, on such a key issue as the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. Also close to harmonization are the fundamental issues of the future universal convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Hitherto unknown standards of openness and of the scope and depth of mutual verification and control are being asserted in the sphere of disarmament in general. There have also been the first but highly important steps towards a restructuring of international relations.

We are sincerely interested in having this growing process of peace and security envelop the Asian-Pacific region too. This is the ultimate objective of the comprehensive Soviet foreign-policy concept for the Asian and Pacific states, which was outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok and then concretised and furthered during his talks in India and in his interview to the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka.

In the past year the Soviet Union undertook a series of important practical steps to implement the said programme, seeing as a crucial factor of regional stability and security the improvement and expansion of bilateral relations with all Asian and Pacific states without exception. An important role in this sense belongs to Soviet-Indian relations. The Soviet Union and India are building interstate relations of such a high standard that they can serve as an attractive example for other states. Not surprisingly, the Delhi Declaration which proclaims the primacy of mutual respect, non-use of force and cooperation in the relations among nations was signed by the USSR and India of all other states. The busy character of Soviet-Indian relations with their invariable mutual

respect, confidence and affection can notably be gathered from the latest summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi during the latter's visit to the Soviet Union, the visit to India by the head of the Soviet government, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the festivals of India in the USSR and of the USSR in India and many other facts.

Our relations with the socialist countries of Asia are becoming ever more dynamic and diversified. This includes broadening contacts with the People's Republic of China, although there are still vast reserves there. The climate in our bilateral relations is improving and the scope of mutual understanding and cooperation is getting broader. One may mention the growing practice of meetings and discussions between high officials of the two countries and the broadening parliamentary exchanges. The two countries are holding regular political consultations on various issues, including border questions. Mutual trade is growing, too.

The USSR and China have many things in common in the past and, we are positive, in the future as well. There are only two nuclear powers in Asia today: the USSR and China, and it is very important that both of them have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

We welcome the statements by Chinese leaders about the need of curbing the nuclear arms race and preventing the militarization of space, and even though there are still differences between the USSR and China on some international issues, there are also increasingly numerous points which create the preconditions for our broader cooperation in the international arena.

The USSR successfully develops its relations with most of the other Asian and Pacific states and notably with the countries of Southeast Asia. The visits in 1987 to a number of countries of that region by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and the visits to the USSR by the Foreign Minister of Thailand, S. Savetsila, and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, M. Mahathir, came as a major contribution to that process. We appreciate the efforts of the ASEAN states aimed at preserving peace and at promoting disarmament and detente, notably on the regional basis, and make a high appraisal of their drive to set up a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia and to turn that region into a zone of peace. To quote Mikhail Gorbachev's message to the participants in the ASEAN in Manila on December 14-15, for its own part the Soviet Union is open for various, including collective, forms of relations with those countries, and this position of ours meets with growing understanding in the region.

The Soviet Union is pursuing a line for stepping up its bilateral relations with the countries in the South Pacific. With some of them we have broadened our contacts, first of all in the political and economic spheres. The visit to the Soviet Union at the end of this year by the Australian

Prime Minister, Robert Hawke, which reaffirmed the mutual desire to add new dimensions and higher quality of Soviet-Australian relations, came as an important event in that direction.

According to the Soviet side, despite the numerous difficulties in Soviet-Japanese relations, there are real preconditions for their improvement. This was confirmed by the recent political consultations in Tokyo at the level of deputy foreign ministers. We think that the establishment of a steady and mutually beneficial partnership with Japan is quite feasible if both sides earnestly work towards that goal.

Among other positive changes of recent time one should mention certain progress in the settlement of various regional conflicts in Asia. Each of them has its own roots, "case history" and methods of "treatment". The USSR is strongly against the linkage of regional conflicts with the state of relations between the USSR and the US, or between the USSR and any other country, and against any preconditions for their settlement. Instead, the Soviet side is strongly in favour of the settlement of such conflicts by political means, first of all in the interests of the people who are the primary victims of those conflicts.

There are promising and growing signs of realism in the search for ways of political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. There is mounting understanding in the region that the "knot" can only be disentangled at the negotiating table by political means rather than through confrontation.

Or, take the national reconciliation proposals put forward by the Afghan leadership, which are a graphic manifestation of new political thinking. There must be a solution, too, to the Korean problem. The USSR has fully supported the DPRK's initiative involving a reduction of troops by the DPRK and South Korea and a subsequent withdrawal of American troops from the southern part of the country.

Another gratifying factor is the growing anti-nuclear sentiments in the Asian and Pacific states. As is generally known, the southern part of the Pacific was recently declared a nuclear-free zone (Rarotonga Treaty). There are growing appeals for the establishment of similar zones in Southeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula. Some countries of the region have adopted anti-nuclear legislation (New Zealand, the Philippines), while Australia and New Zealand are strongly campaigning against French nuclear tests in the Pacific. A more active stand on the issues of nuclear disarmament has been adopted by China. The governments of the overwhelming majority of the countries in the region hold that the goals of nuclear disarmament would be strongly promoted by holding an international conference on the Indian Ocean, which could resolve the question of declaring that region of the planet a peace zone.

The USSR supports the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Asian-Pacific region and strict observance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, since these measures can bar the way to the nuclear arms race in geographical and qualitative parameters. The Soviet Union has not only welcomed the Rarotonga Treaty, but also signed Protocols 2 and 3 to that treaty and is preparing for their ratification. The said protocols have been signed by China, too. We are urging all other nuclear powers to guarantee the non-nuclear status of that zone.

To ensure greater security and mutual confidence, it is essential to translate into practical actions a number of proposals put forward eighteen months ago in Vladivostok, to which there has been no definite reaction. There would notably by an agreement on a coordinated reduction in the activities of the navies, first of all those of the US and the USSR, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and equally useful agreements on the limitation of anti-submarine activities and their complete prohibition in specific zones, as well as on the limitation of the scope of naval exercises in the Pacific and in the adjacent seas. There are other ideas, too, worthy of discussion by the parties concerned.

We are positive that safe and peaceful development of the Asian-Pacific region heavily depends on the acceleration of the processes which promote diversified, mutually beneficial cooperation in the region and help harmonize the interests of the local states. We are proposing to play a more active role in the system of international division of labour in the Asian-Pacific region and are planning in that connection to boost the economic potential of the Asian and especially Pacific regions of our country. An important role in the development of the Soviet Far Eastern regions should be played by the new forms of foreign economic relations—notably, joint ventures—in which representatives of the business circles in various Asian and Pacific countries are already showing keen interest.

The Soviet Union has great interest in active economic cooperation with all countries of the region. We have already taken part in the sessions of the two working groups of the Conference for Pacific Economic Cooperation and would like to work in the Conference as a full-fledged member of that organization. This task will be facilitated by the Soviet National Committee for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation which is being set up in the USSR. We are planning to step up our participation in the work of other regional economic organizations, too.

In suggesting our concept of security and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region, we emphasize the need of developing by joint efforts an integrated and forward-oriented approach to the Pacific political problems, especially those dealing with regional security. We are persistently repeating that the priority in building the structure of regional security must be given to a creative approach and sincere discussion of any ideas and proposals by all countries concerned. The USSR is fully prepared for that.

We are positive that the realities of the region will stimulate the search for optimal forms of its peaceful and safe development. The countries of the region will apparently develop their own model of the structure of security and cooperation which will doubtlessly enrich world political thinking. Asia has already known many examples of political pioneering and this is how it is going to be in the future, too.

The events of the past year have explicitly shown that the Soviet appeal for peace, security and broad cooperation in Asia and the Pacific region is not just a good intention or an abstract notion, but a real goal which can only be attained by the joint efforts of all countries of the region.

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EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

U.S.-Soviet Disarmament Negotiations Theme of Conference

International Defense Conference Opens in Munich
08060916 Hamburg DPA in German 0823 GMT 6 Feb 88

[Excerpt] Munich (DPA)—The 25th International Defense Studies Conference opened this morning in Munich. The main speakers will be Federal Chancellor Kohl this morning and French Defense Minister Andre Giraud this afternoon.

Around 180 participants from nearly all the states of the Western alliance are in Munich for the 2-day anniversary meeting. The main theme is the U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations and their consequences. [passage omitted]

FRG's Kohl Addresses Conference
08061119 Hamburg DPA in German 0932 GMT 6 Feb 88

[Text] Munich (DPA)—In Federal Chancellor Kohl's view the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and its resulting capacity for invasion is the "key issue for security in Europe". Speaking at the 25th International Defense Studies Conference in Munich today, Kohl stressed that the aim of negotiations must therefore be to reduce this imbalance and the ability of the Soviet Union to stage surprise attacks and offensives.

The Vienna consultations on a mandate for future conventional disarmament negotiations could possibly be completed in the spring. Kohl again called for a reduction in nuclear short-range missiles, but at the same time rejected a third zero option in this sphere. Rather, reductions and equal ceilings should be agreed. This is part of the overall disarmament concept of the Alliance, as stipulated by the NATO foreign ministers in Reykjavik last June. Under present conditions, nuclear weapons are "indispensable for effective deterrence". They are in this respect "political weapons".

Reductions of this nature are possible, however, only in connection with the elimination of chemical weapons and the establishment of a conventional balance. Negotiations on the nuclear short-range systems should not be left until after the completion of negotiations in these two spheres. "We are in fact in more need of a flexible defense concept". Referring to the special threat posed to the Federal Republic by short-range nuclear missiles, Kohl stressed that a "nuclear risk restricted to specific areas of federal territory is unacceptable."

Speaking to the 180 or so participants from nearly all the NATO states, Kohl appealed to the U.S. Senate to ratify as soon as possible the agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons signed by President Reagan and Soviet

party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington in December. This INF accord is in the security interests of the West and the people of Europe.

Prominent participants at the 25th International Defense Studies Conference include U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, his French counterpart Andre Giraud, military experts, and many politicians. German representatives include SPD party leader Hans-Jochen Vogel and CSU Chairman Franz-Josef Strauss. The conference, which opened under strict security precautions this morning, is organized by the publisher Ewald von Kleist, who is highly regarded in these circles.

With reference to the negotiations between the United States and the USSR in Geneva on halving the strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons (START), Kohl said it was an ambitious aim to try to sign the agreement at the next summit in Moscow in the spring, "but experiences with the INF agreement show that even the most difficult problems can be solved if both sides want the outcome to be successful." An agreement of this type is also in the interests of the Europeans since a 50 percent reduction would further reduce the threat to Europe and would be a contribution to greater strategic stability.

In future disarmament steps, a worldwide ban on chemical weapons is a "particular priority" for the Federal Government. The problem of controls must not result in fundamental doubts being cast on the verifiability of a chemical weapons agreement. The United States has made a decisive contribution to the Western negotiating concept [verhandlungskonzept] with its 1984 draft treaty. The possibilities for controls are "more far-reaching" than anything ever agreed on internationally. Kohl included the INF agreement here.

Now that the Soviet Union has accepted a large part of these demands, the West should not introduce new negotiating concepts in Geneva. "We should agree on practical proposals which are likely to lead to a consensus of opinion and ensure that any production, storing, or further processing of militarily significant quantities of chemical weapons can be discovered," said Kohl.

Soviet party leader Gorbachev's readiness for compromise and his proposals have brought new movement to Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The main goal of the new Soviet leadership is the modernization and renewal of the Soviet economy. The USSR needs long-term cooperation with the West for this. This may represent "an opportunity for a fair, and not merely tactically-based balance of interests between West and East," said Kohl.

Kohl said the efforts to achieve a European security policy have "not arisen due to mistrust toward our North American allies". French-German cooperation in security policy reflects on the one hand the independent role

of France in the Alliance, but is on the other hand also aimed at "involving France as much as possible in forward defense in the Federal Republic".

Kohl stressed that autonomous European security structures cannot replace the presence of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and the United States' nuclear protection guarantee. "Any reduction in the U.S. troop presence would give the wrong signal to the other side and be a mistake of historic proportions." A Europe united in terms of security policy serves the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.

Carlucci Addresses Conference

08061342 Hamburg DPA in German 1241 GMT 6 Feb 88

[Text] Munich (DPA)—The verifiability of an agreement on strategic (long-range) missiles is, in the view of U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, much more difficult than in the case of the Washington medium-range agreement. At the 25th International Defense Studies Conference in Munich today, Carlucci said the conditions for the verifiability must be "completely different" in the case of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks).

In a discussion contribution, the new Pentagon chief pointed out that in the case of the agreement on the elimination of medium-range weapons (INF Treaty), a whole weapons category was involved. For this reason the testing of one single weapon is already a violation of the treaty.

In the case of a possible agreement on long-range nuclear missiles with the Soviet Union, where the two sides are striving to achieve a 50 percent reduction, many more checks have to be carried out and better procedures for verification must be developed. He countered critics of the agreement on medium-range missiles by saying that the INF Treaty "is effectively verifiable".

FRG's Vogel Views Disarmament

08061541 Hamburg DPA in German 1403 GMT 6 Feb 88

[Text] Munich (DPA)—SPD Bundestag Group Chairman and party leader Hans-Jochen Vogel has called on European governments to show initiative at the talks on conventional disarmament. Vogel complained that there is no concept for this area. Vogel said at the 25th International Defense Studies Conference in Munich today: "The difficulties which await us in this area are much greater than with nuclear weapons." A "structural nonaggression capability" must be the objective.

After concluding the agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on the renunciation of nuclear medium-range missiles, Vogel spoke in favor of a drastic cut in the number of strategic missiles and strict adherence of the ABM treaty on the limitation of anti-missile systems—including a ban on anti-missile systems in space. Negotiations on conventional disarmament

aimed at overcoming existing imbalances and the reduction of short-range nuclear systems and theater nuclear forces must be other elements of a disarmament concept. In addition to ending all nuclear tests Vogel also demanded a global elimination of chemical weapons.

Vogel warned that a refusal to ratify the medium-range missile accord by the Senate would be a "terrible setback" which would shake the "foundations of confidence and cooperation."

The SPD chairman emphatically rejected the modernization of short-range systems. In his view the nuclear weapons cannot be excluded when trying to eliminate conventional superiority. The systems which could be used, both conventionally and nuclear, represent a problem which can be solved only through overlapping nuclear and conventional agreements.

Defense Ministers Address Meeting

08071329 Hamburg DPA in German 1145 GMT 7 Feb 88

[Text] Munich (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has opposed the neglect of conventional defense. Even in the event of a severe financial and manpower situation the conventional sphere has to be consolidated by use of modern technologies, Woerner (CDU) insisted on Sunday at the 25th International Defense Studies Conference in Munich. At the same time he described conventional disarmament as a priority and "the acid test for the Soviets' real desire to disarm." It is not in nuclear arms but in the conventional superiority of the East that the real security problem exists for Europe.

Woerner categorized Europe-based nuclear weapons as indispensable. "As long as we need them, they must be kept effective and modernized as and when needed," he insisted. The minister also opposed uncoupling the U.S. strategic potential from the defense of Europe. Anyone doing this enables a potential attacker to calculate the risk, thus also making limited wars possible. Woerner described the Atlantic Alliance as healthy in its foundations and fundamental convictions. "I contradict all those who regard it as in crisis." British Armed Forces Minister Ian Stewart sees one of the greatest dangers after the Washington agreement on elimination of medium-range missiles as being too great an expectation from the public for future disarmament policy. Like his Netherlands counterpart, Van Eekelen, he stated that the West has to insist on large asymmetrical reductions because of the East's conventional superiority, almost amounting to one-sidedness on the Eastern side.

Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst said the West must first set out its own premises in arms control and not fit in with changing Soviet prospects. Turkish Defense Minister Ercan Vuralhan stressed that

all regions have to have the same sway within the Western alliance. With regard to Greece, he is happy that efforts for dialogue are gradually bearing fruit. This is the start of a rapprochement with the neighboring country.

FRG's Strauss Proposes Initiative

08071502 Hamburg DPA in German 1208 GMT 7 Feb 88

[Text] Munich (DPA)—Franz-Josef Strauss, Bavarian minister-president and CSU chairman, has proposed testing the seriousness of the Soviet desire for further arms control by means of a comprehensive disarmament concept by the West. Speaking to the 25th International Defense Studies Conference in Munich, Strauss said on Sunday that in assessing the new Soviet policy there is of course, the danger that Moscow is saying something different from what it means. He is no Kremlinologist, but the Soviets now have to be taken at their word. No one knows how this policy will develop in the years to come. "If it goes well, we are at the start of a new phase of human history."

Strauss expressed considerable doubts as to whether efforts toward the modernization of weapons systems on the western side, which he also views as necessary, can be accepted by the public. Domestic political difficulties are to be expected here. The Soviet image is becoming more friendly month by month in the West in view of the statements of Kremlin boss Mikhail Gorbachev, who is a "grand master of public relations." Public acceptance of armaments modernization is diminishing to the same extent.

Even in the Bundestag, as well as the clear rejection by the SPD and the Greens, there are "serious voices against it" in the FDP, the coalition partner. In this connection Strauss said "armament issues do not belong in parliaments at all, except in broad outline."

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Government Not To Station U.S. Chemical Weapons

08051353a Hamburg DPA in German 1309 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Text] Bonn/Saarbrücken, (DPA)—According to Defense Minister Manfred Woerner (CDU) the new U.S. binary chemical weapons, the production of which President Reagan ordered this week, will not be stationed in the Federal Republic. This has been agreed with the Americans, he said on Friday on Saarland radio, according to the station. The chemical weapons which exist in the Federal Republic will disappear, he assured.

"There is absolutely no doubt that the Americans will keep this promise," Woerner stressed. Talks and preparations concerning their removal are already underway. The minister pointed out that for 17 years the United States had unilaterally halted the production of chemical

weapons in the hope that the Soviet Union would follow suit. This did not, however, occur. He underlined the Federal Republic's efforts to achieve a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Kohl, Carlucci Discuss Disarmament Prospects

08051405 Hamburg DPA in German 1328 GMT 5 Feb 88

[Excerpt] Bonn, (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has conveyed the Federal Republic's special interest in further disarmament and arms control measures to U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, who made a stop-over in Bonn on Friday as part of his inaugural European tour. After the detailed talk at the Chancellor's Office, Government Spokesman Friedhelm Ost announced that Kohl had underlined the importance of the Western alliance continuing to develop a coherent arms control concept.

According to Ost, the chancellor strongly advocated ratification of the U.S.-Soviet treaty on disarmament in medium-range missiles by the U.S. Senate. He also pointed out that the key problem to security in Europe lies in the superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional armed forces. It is important to reduce the existing imbalance in future negotiations.

Kohl reiterated Bonn's strong interest in a speedy conclusion to the Geneva negotiations on a world-wide ban on chemical weapons. In connection with the establishment of a balance of conventional forces and the elimination of chemical weapons, the issue of land-based nuclear missile systems with a range below 500 km must, in line with the Alliance decisions, also be tackled. A third zero option, said Kohl, is not at issue here.

Carlucci also had talks with his counterpart, Manfred Woerner (CDU). [passage omitted]

Volker Ruehe Interviewed on Post-INF Situation

17041301 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 5 Feb 88 p 6

[Interview with CDU/CSU foreign policy expert Volker Ruehe by Christoph Bertram and Theo Sommer; date and place not given]

[Text] ZEIT: Mr Ruehe, We are sometimes under the impression that the government camp and in particular the CDU/CSU do not know what the objective of the next stage of disarmament policy and Ostpolitik should be.

Ruehe: I do not think we can say that. However, there is a new international situation, there are new debates which will last several years, and in particular a new strategy debate in the West about mapping out an overall security and disarmament policy concept. It is quite obvious we have no ready answers at the beginning of such debates.

ZEIT: Does urging an "overall concept" mean we are trying to avoid making possibly unpleasant decisions?

Ruehe: For the moment I do not think a decision is necessary.

ZEIT: Do you mean in any area of armament and disarmament?

Ruehe: Neither about modernization nor about a new nuclear disarmament concept. We have to get out of a situation where decisions have been made on partial areas. We need an overall approach to align security policy priorities, arms control policy objectives, and political relations between East and West better than we have done in the past.

ZEIT: The double-zero solution is in the process of being ratified in Moscow and Washington. The treaty could become effective in the spring. Then a decision will have to be made on how and in which fields disarmament should be continued.

Ruehe: I am confident the treaty will be ratified. Then the START negotiations are under way...

ZEIT: ... the negotiations on a 50 percent reduction in strategic systems ...

Ruehe: ... the negotiations on chemical weapons have been under way for many years ...

ZEIT: ... and are deadlocked.

Ruehe: No. There are some objective difficulties that are not attributable to a lack of goodwill. In addition, negotiations are being held on conventional disarmament between the Atlantic and the Urals, and I think real negotiations can begin in the second half of this year. Those are the most important objectives. The other nuclear weapons, in particular the short-range weapons, will have to be addressed in that overall concept.

ZEIT: We settle the major things without an overall concept; do we need such a concept for the minor things?

Ruehe: That is not so. The negotiations have been going on for many years, and of course we have clear ideas of the objective. However, regarding nuclear weapons, and in particular the nuclear weapons in Europe, we have a new discussion—on the one hand, a strategy discussion, and on the other, a discussion about whether the structure of nuclear weapons that would be left following the INF treaty—the treaty on the zero solution for medium-range missiles—would be politically credible and acceptable, especially to the German public. That certainly is an issue requiring an overall concept.

ZEIT: An overall concept of armament, disarmament, defense, and deterrence in Europe and for Europe?

Ruehe: Right.

ZEIT: The Western alliance is known to have a very hard time agreeing on details. For example, when should the short-range weapons be negotiated? If possible, not at all—the French and British think, or as late as possible—as the Americans think, or as soon as possible—as the Federal Government thinks?

Ruehe: That is exactly why I say there should be no partial decisions, but discussions should be held and decisions made in an overall context.

As for the precedence of the negotiations, I think there is a contrast. The negotiations on strategic systems and chemical weapons take precedence because they are in the final stage. The negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe are being prepared. There remains the question how important negotiations on the remaining nuclear systems are. We have to avoid extreme positions. I mean we cannot say we will negotiate on them when we have a conventional balance. But I also would not consider it wise to start such negotiations without the other problems having been clarified in the Western alliance.

ZEIT: What is your position? You were an opponent of the double-zero solution, which has now been adopted. You were also opposed to the weapons with ranges of between 500 and 1,000 km being reduced to zero.

Ruehe: I was an opponent of the double-zero solution because in my view we lose flexibility regarding disarmament in the less-than-500-km range, even though that is urgently necessary in the German interests.

ZEIT: Some 4,000 nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe. Half of their artillery has a range of less than 25 km. Are these weapons that the Soviets have to fear, or are they weapons that just deter us?

Ruehe: They are intended to deter, because they are supposed to prevent troop concentrations on the other side. But they also constitute a big self-deterrent factor. Therefore, I think that in defining the minimum extent of nuclear deterrence in Europe—and this would be a new approach—we should, irrespective of the technical issues of the negotiations, try to find out what the absolute minimum extent is in terms of quantity and quality. If we have a convincing concept of a mixture of reduction and modernization, I could very well imagine a 50 percent reduction, analogous to the strategic systems. The figures are not decisive.

ZEIT: What does "modernization" mean? Extend the ranges?

Ruehe: No, not necessarily. There are a number of modernization decisions that will be made on short-range systems and aircraft. They were addressed by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Montebello in 1983.

But we now have a new situation and we need a new overall concept considering all nuclear weapons in West Europe. Then numerical reductions in connection with modernization would be possible. I do not want to state where that would be possible. I think it is more convincing to define that in the Western alliance instead of precipitously starting new negotiations and then arriving at a situation that would again be considered dissatisfactory.

ZEIT: But could the West offer an initial step toward halving the arsenal?

Ruehe: No, that would not be an offer to the other side, but it would have to be a mixture of reduction and modernization that would have to be worked out within NATO.

ZEIT: So you would reduce unilaterally?

Ruehe: That could very well be possible, but it could partly be in the form of negotiation offers.

What is important is, first, for the Western side to define what the most convincing concept would be. In doing so, we will not be able to arrive at an absolute minimum, because that also depends on conventional disarmament negotiations. However, because we think that nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in preventing war in Europe, there would be a certain number of nuclear weapons that would not be negotiable between East and West.

Second, in such a process we should make sure that those weapons the Germans find most difficult psychologically to accept—nuclear artillery—be drastically reduced. I could imagine they would be reduced by about 80 percent and that we would really concentrate on an absolute minimum to deter troop concentrations on the other side.

Third, that minimum would also have to include strategic weapons such as the submarine-based systems assigned to SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe]. Qualitatively, there should be a spectrum of shorter- and longer-range systems, basically a realignment and restructuring, which would also counteract the unease that has been developing in those who advocate nuclear deterrence.

ZEIT: Mr Ruehe, you said the shorter the ranges, the dearer the Germans.

Ruehe: Or, to formulate it differently, the more German the effect. That is an undisputable fact! The special situation of our country, having nuclear weapons on our soil, that would have to be used on our soil and nowhere else, has been aggravated. If we were to agree on the current structure we would run the risk in the long term of losing the majority for nuclear deterrence in the Federal Republic. Therefore it would also be in the West's interests to start making changes as I outlined.

ZEIT: But the structural changes you outlined would mean counterarmament [nachruestung].

Ruehe: That is a totally incorrect term.

ZEIT: It would mean new weapons.

Ruehe: A mixture of reduction and modernization. If you intend to keep to weapons systems—and we believe in nuclear deterrence—you also have to make sure they have not become totally obsolete. Thus modernization should be possible as an option.

ZEIT: Just as an option, or in reality?

Ruehe: We will have to see that in connection with the overall concept. I reject isolated modernization decisions now regarding short-range systems. But it would be equally unwise to say that modernization of nuclear weapons should never be possible again. In that case we should give up nuclear weapons.

ZEIT: The U.S. Army is considering developing a tactical missile with a 320 km range. It wants to have about 1,000 of them as a successor to the Lance missiles, of which 88 are now deployed on our territory. Is that your approach to "modernization" in quantity and quality?

Ruehe: No. I am not at all prepared to accept such modernization discussions for limited areas. I want a general concept of all Western nuclear weapons in Europe. We must decide on the structure. We must reduce the figures further, and in that connection we must consider where modernization will be necessary.

ZEIT: What is actually happening to introduce that general concept in the NATO bodies in order to achieve agreement in Europe?

Ruehe: The German side is most interested in credible nuclear deterrence, while others tend to make the post-INF situation permanent because they fear denuclearization. I do not see that danger if we have a proper general concept. In order to achieve that, the decisive impetus must come from us.

We have an opportunity in this respect because there are modernization requests concerning the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe. We, the German side, must and will make it clear that there cannot be any isolated modernization. There is simply no way to avoid a general concept. It must not be a purely military matter. It must be more on the level of a new Harmel report, taking new political developments between East and West into consideration. We need time for that, and we should take that time.

ZEIT: German initiatives for a general concept of the alliance presuppose cohesion of the Federal Government on those issues. One has the impression occasionally that there is lack of German agreement on a general concept.

Ruehe: It has not yet been fully discussed even within the Federal Government. The German side, too, has no final answers at this early stage. However, that is not shameful. In view of the grave problems I find it quite natural. However, there are important ideas, such as the example defining the minimum nuclear deterrence.

ZEIT: Is that minimum not an ideal?

Ruehe: That is not bad.

ZEIT: But nobody has achieved it yet. Everybody will feel differently about it: What one side considers a minimum will appear to be an excessive quantity to the other.

Ruehe: That is still in dispute. It cannot be determined absolutely. It will also depend on the nature of the conventional forces' ratio.

ZEIT: Our image of the opponent is also part of a general concept. Is it still an adversary, who is just waiting for us to nod off for a moment in order to assault us, or must our whole idea of being threatened change? Do we in West Europe still need nuclear weapons if the Soviets decrease their conventional preponderance, as Gorbachev indicated?

Ruehe: Political intentions can change at short notice. As to deterrence and the prevention of war, one should assess the long-term military potential of the other side. Therefore I urge the Soviet Union to conform to its stated peaceful intentions and create peaceful potential as well. That implies the reduction of the invasive

capability, in particular in the conventional field. However, there is no doubt that we hope Mr Gorbachev will apply every means to the modernization of his country, less to the modernization of weapons.

ZEIT: Suppose there is a balance in the conventional field. Are you still convinced that an element of nuclear deterrence remains necessary in Europe?

Ruehe: I think that a security—prevention of war—makes a limited number of nuclear weapons in Europe necessary.

ZEIT: U.S. nuclear weapons? Or do the French or British suffice?

Ruehe: No. U.S. nuclear weapons, because there are just two world powers that can balance mutually. There are other countries behind the British and French nuclear weapons, which—even if the weapons had the same caliber technically—cannot balance the Soviet Union.

ZEIT: But is the CDU/CSU talking itself into something in the current situation that it might deeply regret some day? You want to maintain deterrence and defense, and you want disarmament at the same time. But if Mr Gorbachev says: "I am ready to withdraw all nuclear warheads from East Europe. I am also ready, for instance, to withdraw four divisions from Czechoslovakia." Where will the politicians be then, including in the government camp, who refuse to join in?

Ruehe: The counter-concept to denuclearization in Europe that Gorbachev continues to pursue takes the initiative in determining a definition of the nuclear minimum and makes it obvious and politically credible for everybody. We should take the initiative: It is our conviction that we will also need a minimum in Europe to prevent war and, indeed, nuclear systems are part of it.

END

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